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Przyczyny udanego przełamania frontu pod Gorlicami
Abstract: The paper looks at the Austro-German breakthrough at Gorlice of 1915 which 
lead to a strategic defeat of the Tsarist forces. The authors analyse the strength Russian 
positions, the use of air reconnaissance by the Central Powers as well as the deployment of 
heavy artillery and reserves. The morale factor, and, perhaps most importantly, the faulty 
Russian chain of command are discussed and as the reasons for the Austro-German victory.
Streszczenie: Tekst analizuje przełamanie frontu przez wojska austro-niemieckie pod 
Gorlicami w 1915  roku, które doprowadziło do strategicznej porażki sił rosyjskich. 
Autorzy analizują siłę pozycji rosyjskich, użycie przez Państwa Centralne rozpoznania lot-
niczego, ciężkiej artylerii oraz rezerw. Omówiono również aspekt morale oraz, co najważ-
niejsze, wadliwy łańcuch dowodzenia wojsk carskich. 
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Introduction
One can find numerous examples of attacks on strongly entrenched positions during the World War One. Most of such actions ended in 
bloodshed and the attackers gained virtually nothing. Only a few opera-
tions were successful, mainly by applying new tactics or introducing new 
weapons, such as tanks. Neither of those was the reason for the success in 
the Battle of Gorlice (1915) on the Eastern Front, however. The breaking 
of the Russian entrenched front there had an immense significance, not 
only on the tactical, but, even more importantly, operational and strategic 
levels.1 It forced the Russians to give up most of what they had conquered 
in Galicia in the course of 1914 and much of Russian territory. 
The primary goal of this article is to study the reasons for this success. 
We shall also try to compare all the discussed circumstances to those of the 
Western Front where such a successful offensive was never impossible.
A short characteristics of the Russian positions
It has to be admitted that the Russian frontline fit very well to the moun-
tainous area of Gorlice. At some important places, it consisted of three 
separate lines of trenches, the first one being the strongest.
The Russian Army had considerable experience in building entrench-
ments from the war with Japan (1904–05). They tried to place them at 
some distance from the enemy and to provide the soldiers therein with 
some cover against shrapnels. However, not all of the trenches were sup-
plied with traverses, which made them vulnerable to high-explosive artil-
lery shells. In effect, heavy bombardment could easily destroy the entire 
stretches of Russian positions. German soldiers were able to observe as di-
rect hits into the strongpoints threw machineguns with their crews into the 
 1 Although this battle was very significant for the course of the Great War, it has 
not been researched thoroughly in English historiography, and even newest analyses seem 
to be superficial and lack the Russian perspective (cf. R. L. DiNardo, Breakthrough: The 
Gorlice–Tarnów Campaign, 1915, Praeger, Santa Barbara, Calif. 2010).
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air. If a shell exploded inside a shelter, one could observe flying wood, straw 
and even body parts.2
Barbed wire was in short supply, which meant the Russians had to 
resort to building chevaux de frise. Fougasses placed in front of the first 
trenches would complement some of the most important stretches of the 
Russian front.
Generally, as the British military attaché, Sir Alfred Knox, stated, only 
two lines of defence had been prepared, and the Russians did not change 
the positions of their batteries although these had been well known to the 
Austrians long before the beginning of the offensive in May.3 Furthermore, 
the precious time needed to reinforce the positions was lost because the 
news of fresh German troops arriving opposite was generally ignored by the 
Russian command (see below).
Air activity
Each corps of the German 11th Army had an aircraft squadron charged 
with two principal tasks. The first one was to photograph the most cru-
cial sections of the Russian positions, and the second to help in register-
ing heavy artillery barrage by signalling with red or purple smoke, as the 
Russians observed.4 The Russian 3rd Army lacked anti-aircraft artillery and 
so was practically unable to disturb this activity. Rifle fire from the ground 
was ineffective in such cases.5
 2 F. Babendieck, Staszkowka und die Lipier Höhen. Das Regiment Kaiser Alexander in 
der Durchbruchsschlacht am 2. und 3. Mai 1915, [in:] Ehrenbuch der Garde. Die preußische 
Garde im Weltkriege 1914–1919, ed. E. von Eisenhardt-Rothe, M. Lezius, vol. 1, Berlin– 
–Stuttgart 1920, p. 188; O. T. von Kalm, Gorlice, p. 45.
 3 A. W. F. Knox, With the Russian Army, 1914–1917: Being Chiefly Extracts from the 
Diary of a Military Attache, New York 1921, p. 282.
 4 “Shtab 3-j Armii”, [in:] Gorlickaja operacija. Sbornik dokumentov, Moskva 1941, 
doc. 80, p. 72.
 5 B. V. Gerua, Vospominanija o moej zhizni, Parizh 1969, vol. 2, p. 71.
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Located near the center of the 11th Army’s position, the Pustki Hill 
(449 m.a.s.l.) was one of the highest hills within the Russian positions, 
overlooking much of the frontline north of Gorlice. Not oblivious to its 
importance, the Russians developed a fortified position with multi-tiered 
trenches over the course of winter and spring of 1915. The Austrian VI 
Corps deployed opposite that hill was assigned a German Fliegerkompanie 
whose good quality aerial photographs, essential in planning the artillery 
fire for the first day of battle, were praised by the Corps’ commander.6 
Naturally enough, other key points of the Russian position were also care-
fully photographed, which supplemented the outcome of ground obser-
vation.
The airmen were able to identify the “concentration of enemy’s forces 
in the region of Jasło–Biecz–Żmigród in the strength of 1–2 divisions.”7 
These were probably the 63th Infantry Division (ID), the 2nd brigade of 
the 81st ID and the 16th Cavalry Division deployed in the area.8 Another 
report from 28 April said that the Russians were trying to improve their 
trenches, but behind the front everything is peaceful, even though the Rus-
sians had already known about the arrival of the German troops.9
Contrary to some authors, we are, however, reluctant to give any 
more credit for the win to the Austrian and German aviation. After all, its 
role was auxiliary.
Heavy artillery
The concentration of heavy artillery near Gorlice was impressive. The 
German 11th Army’s artillery consisted of 624 guns (466 light and 
158 heavy) assigned to a front section of 32.3 kilometres (20 mi), i.e. al-
most 20 artillery pieces per kilometre. No less importantly, the gunners had 
all the necessary munition at their disposal. The 11th Army staff ordered to 
 6 A. Arz, Zur Geschichte des grossen Krieges 1914–1918, Wien–Leipzig–München 
1924, pp. 59–60.
 7 BA-MA, PH 5 II/303, Kriegstagebuch des Oberkommandos der 11. Armee.
 8 Cf. Gorlickaja operacija, map 2a.
 9 BA-MA, PH 5 II/303, Kriegstagebuch des Oberkommandos der 11. Armee.
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amass 1,000 shells per field guns battery (1,200 in the case of light pieces), 
800 per howitzer battery and 500 per mortar battery.10 The Russian artillery 
was not only inferior in numbers (675 guns and howitzers, only 3 of them 
heavy), but had a very limited supply of ammunition. Before Mackensen’s 
offensive, it was allowed only to use 8 shells per gun daily.11
The Austro-Hungarian 3rd and 4th Armies supported the advance 
on the right and the left flank. They had 144 and 453 guns respectively.12 
These numbers were sufficed bombard the most important Russian strong-
points and to neutralise its defenders.
The deployment of the reserves
The German 11th Army consisted of five corps, four of which were de-
ployed in the first line, and the fifth was in reserve. Reinforcements consti-
tuted roughly 20 per cent of the attacking forces and were massed behind 
both wings of Mackensen’s army. Also the Austro-Hungarian 4th Army had 
its reserves – the Szende Brigade – behind its right flank, so it could be used 
to support the neighbouring Guards Corps.
Mackensen deployed his reserves on 5 May (20th ID less one infantry 
regiment, already engaged on 3 May13) and during the following afternoon 
 10 11. Armeeoberkommando, Besondere Anordnungen nr 8 (28 April 1915), [in:] 
L. Riedl, Die Gefechtstätigkeit des k.u.k. VI Korps in der Durchbruchschlacht bei Gorlice, 
Budapest 1928, p. 115.
 11 B. V. Gerua, Vospominanija o moej zhizni, vol. 2, p. 74; Istorija pervoj mirovoj vojny 
1914–1918 gg., vol. 2, Moskva 1975, p. 30.
 12 O. T. von Kalm, Gorlice, attachment 2.
 13 The division entered into battle on the right wing of the 11th Army with the task 
of crossing the Wisłoka River (see BA-MA, PH 8 I/406, Abschrift des Kriegstagebuches 
der 20. Infanterie-Division 30.4.–30.6.1915; J. Centek, Działania pruskiej 119. Dywizji 
Piechoty w dniach 2 i 3 maja 1915 r., [in:] Bitwa pod Gorlicami. Studia z perspektywy stule-
cia, ed. J. Centek, S. Kułacz, K. Ruszała, p. 95).
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(19th ID14) as complete units.15 That it so say, the reserves helped to exploit 
the success and to transform the tactical victory into an operational one.
Apart from central reserves, each level of the German and Aus-
tro-Hungarian command held back some units. For instance, on 2 
May, 1915 the Guards Corps sent three of its four brigades into bat-
tle. The other one was ordered to cover the left flank of the Corps, 
and at the same time, the whole 11th Army. The brigades thrown 
into battle had at least a battalion in the rear.16 Similarly, the 
VI Corps had 16 infantry battalions on the first line, further 8 as divisional 
reserves and 4 as corps reserve, all of which were billeted at a reasonable 
distance.17
The German and Austrian use of reserves outlined here con-
trasts sharply with the Russian policy. Their various levels reinforce-
ments were thrown into battle as small units and without a general 
plan. The only larger reserve, the 3rd Caucasian Corps, which could 
have at least delay the advance of German 11th Army had it been de-
ployed in good defensive positions, was used offensively instead. Togeth-
er with the remnants of 10th Army Corps and the Volodchenko Group, 
it tried to counterattack a much stronger enemy.18 This action inflicted 
heavy losses on both sides and reduced the potential of the Caucasian 
troops.19
 14 The division took over the cover of the left flank of the Guards Corps and the 
German 11th Army. Its task was to close the gap there and to reestablish the connection 
with the Austro-Hungarian 4th Army (see Der Weltkrieg 1914 bis 1918, Vol. 7, Berlin 
1931, p. 405; J. Centek, Korpus Gwardii w bitwie pod Gorlicami, Warszawa 2015, p. 124).
 15 With the exception for their artillery, which had been used earlier.
 16 See Kalm, Gorlice, map 3. 
 17 L. Riedl, Die Gefechtstätigkeit, p. 115.
 18 General Radko Dimitriev underestimated attackers’ strength. During the assault 
on 2nd May, he informed the 10th Corps’ commander that he had about 2–3 divisions 
against him. (“Sherzhiny. Komandiru 10-go Korpusa”, [in:] Gorlickaja operacija, doc. 123, 
p. 100.)
 19 Orders for attack see: “Holm. Konsk, Tarnov, Sluch, Sambor. Komandiram 8, 
9, 10, 12, 21, 24 3-go Kavkazsogo korpusov, generalu Volodchenko. Operativnyj pri-
kaz”, [in:] Gorlickaja operacija, doc. 178, p. 123; “Prikaz po gruppe generala ot artillerii 
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Such decisions lead to substantial losses and the demoralisation of 
many units. Just in five days, most of the Russian troops engaged in the 
battle were almost literally destroyed. For example, the remnants of Rus-
sian 31st ID (which was engaged on 2 May 1915 with Austro-Hungarian 
6th Corps and the far right wing of the Prussian Guards) consisted only 
of about 1,500 men, although it was reinforced by two infantry regiments 
during the battle. Since the division’s ranks at the beginning of the opera-
tions had been about 70 per cent full, the unit dwindled from approxi-
mately 15,000 to 1,500 men. In other words, it sustained casualties at the 
rate of 90 per cent. Despite that, the Russians still kept the division on the 
first line.20
The morale factor
The Russian 3rd Army was not a monolith; there were significant differenc-
es between its units. The Central Powers’ offensive mostly hit the Russian 
10th Army Corps, which had been previously engaged in the Carpathian 
Mountains and had sustained notable losses. In May 1915, its division had 
approximately 70 per cent strength. The worst performance on 2 May was 
that of the Russian 70th ID. The Prussian 1st Guards Division smashed 
its left wing, broke a gap between the Russian 9th and 10th Army Corps 
and allowed the neighbouring 2nd Guards Division to capture the heavily 
defended village of Staszkówka.21
The 70th ID broke down probably because it was a so-called reserve 
division, formed during the mobilisation and its soldiers were surely not 
Irmanova”, [in:] Gorlickaja operacija, doc. 181, p. 124; “Prikaz 31-Pehotnoj Divizii”, [in:] 
Gorlickaja operacija, doc. 187, p. 130.
 20 “Komandiru 3-go Kavkazskogo Korpusa”, [in:] Gorlickaja operacija, doc. 219, 
p. 145.
 21 BA-MA, ‘Abschrift des Kriegstagebuches des Gardekorps 16.4 Bis 30.6.1915’, 
n.d., PH 6 I/226; ‘Abschrift des BA-MA, Kriegstagebuches Der 1. Garde-Infanterie-
Division 1.5 Bis 30.6.1915’, n.d., PH 8/449, BA-MA, ‘Abschrift des Kriegstagebuches 
Der 2. Garde-Infanterie-Division 2.5.–30.6.1915’, n.d., PH 8/I431.
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the best. Even the weak Austro-Hungarian 106th Landsturm ID managed 
to beat its elements.22
Lack of initiative and cooperation; faulty chain of command
One of the most important factors determining the combat value of a unit 
is its commanders’ initiative. This feature may also apply to particular parts 
of the chain of command. In the case of the Russian 3rd Army, they were 
generally passive. Despite various measures undertaken by the arriving 
Germans – like wearing Austro-Hungarian caps while on reconnaissance to 
avoid recognition (the infamous Pickelhaube would be noticed at once), the 
Russians had not only discovered the fact that fresh troops arrived in the 
area, but also managed to establish their identity. Boris Gerua, the Russian 
31 ID’s chief of staff, stated in his memoirs that soldiers had captured 
a German officer carrying a map with German and Austro-Hungarian bat-
teries drawn on it.23 Even if the story is untrue,24 the divisional commander 
stated that the Austro-Hungarian 39th Honved ID left the trenches and 
new forces took its place as early as 27 April.25 A day later, the Russian 3rd 
Army’s chief of Staff informed the corps commanders about skirmishes 
with German patrols.26
Despite the fact that there were still a few days till the beginning of 
the offensive, the Russians did not do anything more serious to prepare 
themselves for the upcoming blow. Not only did they fail to organize more 
 22 T.  Woźny, ‘Działania 4. Armii austro-węgierskiej w czasie bitwy gorlickiej 
(2–8 Maja 1915 R.)’, [in:] Front Wschodni I wojny światowej. Studia z dziejów militarnych 
i polityczno-społecznych, ed. M. Baczkowski, K. Ruszała, Kraków 2013, p. 64f.
 23 B. V. Gerua, Vospominanija o moej zhizni, vol. 2, p. 75.
 24 German publications and relevant war diaries (Kriegstagebuch) of corps and divi-
sions seem do not mention such an incident.
 25 “Prikaz 31-j Pehotnoj Divizii No. 131”, [in:] Gorlickaja operacija, doc. 49, p. 56f.
 26 BA-MA, PH 6 I/226, Abschrift des Kriegstagebuches des Gardekorps 16.4 bis 
30.6.1915; “Komandiram 9, 10, 12, 21, 24, 29-go i Konnogo korpusov”, [in:] Gorlickaja 
operacija, doc. 51, p. 59.
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strategic reserves, but even did not move the existing one – the 3rd Cauca-
sian Army Corps – closer to the frontline.
A careful analysis of the volume of documents concerning the bat-
tle of Gorlice published in 1941 allows us to understand how the Russian 
commanders at various levels contributed to this major defeat. Since the be-
ginning of the operation, they sent overoptimistic reports, which informed 
about fierce fighting but also about some successful counterattacks.27 Such 
news surely made the understanding of the actual course of events more 
difficult for the Russian 3rd Army headquarters, but any evidence of seri-
ous attempts to change this situation during the battle is hard to find.
Even when the disaster was complete – on 6 May 1915 – General 
Radko Dimitriev desperately tried to find any reserves for his exhausted 
troops and to throw them into battle. He stated that there are 2,000 sol-
diers in the 10th Corps’ sector who were preparing fortifications on the 
rear and that it would be more advantageous to send them to the first line.28
The above observations seem to apply to lower grade commanders 
as well. They were unable to relieve any of the hard-pressed troops and to 
contribute to slowing or stopping the enemy’s advance.
Such a passive attitude was surely not the case on the Central Powers’ 
side. For example, on 2 May, the Austro-Hungarian 12th ID was not only 
able to push forward, but also to help its neighbours: the Austro-Hungar-
ian 39th Honved ID on its left and the Prussian 81th Reserve ID from 
the 41st Reserve Corps on its right.29 The left wing of the Prussian Guards 
Corps cooperated with Austro-Hungarian 9th Corps in capturing Russian 
defences in its sectors.30 It is worth emphasizing that in the latter case, the 
units cooperated beyond corps and army boundaries (i.e. at the junction of 
the German 11th and Austro-Hungarian 4th Army).
 27 “Holm. Nachalniku shtaba glavnokomandujushhego”, [in:] Gorlickaja operacija, 
doc. 121, p.  99; “Komandujushhemu 3-j Armej”, [in:] Gorlickaja operacija, doc. 143, 
p. 106.
 28 “Komandiru 10-go Korpusa”, [in:] Gorlickaja operacija, doc. 294, p. 177.
 29 L. Riedl, Die Gefechtstätigkeit…, p. 26–32.
 30 ÖStA/KA, Ms.-Wk.R/30 1915; Th. Uriel, Die Operationen der 3. und 4. Armee 
bei Gorlice-Tarnów v. 2.5–3.6.1915. Auf Grund der Feldakten, p. 46; J. Centek, Korpus 
Gwardii, p. 73.
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Coalition warfare
The German and Austro-Hungarian forces which were to break through en-
emy’s positions were united under German general August von Mackensen 
who was appointed commander of the German 11th Army. But this unit was 
not purely German – one of its corps was Austro-Hungarian. Mackensen 
was at the same time head of an Army Group which consisted of his and 
the Austro-Hungarian 4th Army. The Austro-Hungarian commander-in-
chief, Archduke Friedrich, was Mackensen’s superior, formally at least. The 
Central Powers managed to overcome problems of coalitional warfare and 
to create a capable unit with mixed, German and Austro-Hungarian, com-
position. One may safely assume that sharing the same language served the 
allies well in this matter.31
The Anglo-French coalition warfare was markedly inferior that of 
the Central Powers demonstrated in Galicia. During the great battle of 
the Somme, for instance, the British and French forces seemed to conduct 
separate operations. Their level of cooperation in coalition warfare clearly 
could not match that of Mackensen’s Army Group.
Let us now briefly compare the most important of the circumstances 
discussed above with those of the Western Front, as this seems to offer 
a more insightful conclusion.
Summation and comparison with the Western Front
One of the most important factors in every military conflict is oper-
ational mobility. On the Western Front, both sides were able to send 
reinforcements into battle relatively quickly thanks to the dense net of 
railway lines. In most cases, this enabled to them check the momentum 
of the enemy’s offensive. Such an action was impossible in Galicia due 
to the scarcity of railway lines, paved roads and, especially in the western 
part, the hilly terrain.
 31 O. T.  von Kalm, Gorlice, p.  16f; Österreich-Ungarns letzter Krieg 1914–1918, 
vol. 2: Das Kriegsjahr 1915, Wien 1931, p. 316.
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The Russians were also significantly inferior in artillery, especially 
heavy, while in France either side had enough batteries to inflict heavy 
losses on the enemy. This inferiority was not only caused by a smaller 
number of pieces, but also by the lack of ammunition which decreased 
the strength of available batteries. This important factor is often omitted 
in comparisons of various armies.
The Russian positions at Gorlice were not designed to withstand 
heavy bombardment. The Germans, on the other hand, built formidable 
trenches and shelters which, despite the enormous ammunition use by 
the Allies on the Somme front, for instance, saved many soldiers’ lives. 
Since the artillery activity was much higher on the Western Front, the 
soldiers were simply more used to it and their morale did not collapse so 
quickly when they were exposed to heavy shelling.32
Summing up, the sophisticated tactics of that time and careful plan-
ning would have probably not been enough to ensure such an operational 
success.33 It was only possible later in the war, thanks to the introduction of 
the shock troops and their infiltration tactics. Therefore, the Central Pow-
ers owed their success at Gorlice mostly to Russian deficiencies rather than 
their own advantages.
 32 In his memoirs, General Karl von Einem, the commander the 3rd Army on the 
Western Front, characterized the units which had previously fought on the Eastern Front 
as not used to the conditions of the warfare in France and unable to bear a massive artillery 
shelling (cf. Karl von Einem, Ein Armeeführer erlebt den Weltkrieg, Leipzig 1938, p. 362 
and 375).
 33 During the battles of Vailly and Soupir in October and November 1914, and in 
the battle of Soissons in January 1915, the German 3rd Corps (Hans von Seeckt was its 
chief of staff) was able to achieve tactical successes, but it was far from breaking the en-
emy’s frontline.
